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Abstract
From a general abstract system theoretical perspective, a quantum-like system
description in the spirit of a generalized Quantum Theory may appear to be simpler
and more natural than a classically inspired description. We investigate the reasons
why we nevertheless conceive ourselves embedded into a classically structured world.
Categorial, physical and pragmatic reasons are proposed as explanations.
1 Introduction
The underlying world views of classical and quantum physics are quite different. For
contrasting purposes and neglecting intermediate positions they might be characterized
as follows:
The world of classical physics is a realistic world of facts, which exist independently of
their observation and are registered but not created by the act of measurement.
On the other hand, the world of Quantum Theory is a world of potentialities, which,
by the act of measurement, are elevated to a factual status as measurement results. As
compared to classical physics, the role of the observer is not only a receptive, registering
but an active and in part creative one. Indeed, the violation of Bell’s inequalities [1]
strongly suggests an exclusion of local realism in the spirit of classical physics and the
Kochen-Specker theorem [2, 3] is an obstruction for any realistic hidden variable theory
with non-contextual observables.
In our everyday world we are used and inclined to consider the classical world view as
the view of common sense, whereas quantum physics looks like a rather extravagant view,
admittedly imposed by experimental facts but emerging only lately and being mainly
confined to the notoriously strange microphysical world.
In this note, we shall present evidence that quantum features of the world are much more
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widespread and natural than suggested by current common sense, in fact to such an ex-
tent that one may wonder about the reasons for the strong favoring of the classical view.
For what follows it is essential to realize that the world is not directly given to us as such
but only as and as far as it appears to us on our inner screen. (Using a common philo-
sophical term we refer to this as to the phenomenal character of the world.) Probably,
almost everybody will subscribe to this apparently trivial statement, but, taken seriously,
it leads to far reaching consequences. The question is about the relationship between the
phenomenal and the ”real” world. Naive realism asserts that the world essentially appears
to us as it really is. In the terminology of Thomas Metzinger [4] na¨ıve realism employs
a transparent model : We are modelling creatures, creating representations of the outer
world, of our body and also higher order representations of our cognitive system. A model
is called opaque, if it is recognizable as a representation and transparent (invisible), if its
representational character is not manifest and if, hence, the representation is identified
with the represented entity.
A reflection about the foundations of Quantum Theory and physics in general must con-
tain an investigation of the the prerequisites given by the basics of the human mode of
existence and cognition, which are prior to any physical theory or act of measurement.
It is safe to say that the classical world view is closer to the strong assumption of na¨ıve
realism than the quantum view, which, attributing an active constitutive role to the
observer, is more aware of the phenomenal character of the world and, in a way, more
cautious.
Caution and methodological prudence are no logically cogent reason for a widespread
”ontophobic” attitude of contemporary philosophy, an abstention from any kind of onto-
logical commitment in favor of phenomenal, existential, language or discourse analytical
approaches. Later on we shall see that our cognitive system strongly urges if not compels
us to build at least tentative ontological scenarios, for instance classically realistically in-
spired ones as for some interpretations of Bohmian mechanics [5], or scenarios of quantum
type.
Early on from the advent of quantum mechanics Niels Bohr was convinced that the quan-
tum theoretical figure of complementarity was of universal significance far beyond the
realm of physics. Speculation along this line never ceased [6, 7]. In particular Wolf-
gang Pauli pointed out the possibly universal importance of quantum-like entanglement
[8, 9]. The idea of quantum reality gained unfortunate popularity in esoteric circles but
it was also followed in a serious and formally well controlled way [10]. Indeed, a quantum
analogue structure may be suspected to be realized, whenever the order of successive ob-
servations/measurements matters.
A world of strict quantum-like constitution would be a world of potentialities. It would
show a strongly phenomenal character, because it would be an appearing world whenever
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a measurement result becomes factual for an observer. From a less observer centered
point of view and using a philosophical term, such a world might also be called a worlding
(German: ”weltend”) world.
Assuming that the significance of quantum-like structural features beyond the realm of
physics in the narrow sense were a plain direct effect of quantum physics would amount
to an extreme physical reductionism of very low plausibility. Rather one should look for
structural isomorphisms with quantum physics. In general, formal work on wider appli-
cability of Quantum Theory sought to employ the full quantum theoretical formalism to
non physical situations. An alternative is the isolation and formalization of a conceptual
core of Quantum Theory followed by an investigation of the extended applicability of
the resulting generalized scheme. This has been undertaken under the name of ”Weak
Quantum Theory” or ”Generalized Quantum Theory” [11, 12, 13], which we are going the
describe in the next section.
2 Generalized Quantum Theory
Weak Quantum Theory [11, 12] arose from an axiomatic formulation of physical Quan-
tum Theory by leaving out all features which seemed to be special for physical systems.
The term ”Weak Quantum Theory” was chosen because the resulting system of axioms is
weaker than quantum physics. It is of course stronger in as much as it has a wider range
of applicability. In order to avoid misunderstandings we now prefer the term ”Generalized
Quantum Theory” (GQT). In order to make this presentation reasonably self sustained
we here repeat a short account of the vital structural features of GQT to which we can
refer in the sequel. For recent developments and applications see [13].
The following notions are taken over from quantum physics:
System: A system is anything which can be (imagined to be) isolated from the rest of the
world and be subject to an investigation. A system can be as general as an object or a
school of art together with all persons involved in production and interpretation. Unlike
the situation in, e.g., Classical mechanics the identification of a system is not always a
trivial procedure but sometimes a creative act. In many cases it is possible to define
subsystems inside a system
State: A system must have the capacity to reside in different states without losing its
identity as a system. One may differentiate between pure states, which correspond to
maximal possible knowledge of the system and mixed states corresponding to incomplete
knowledge.
Observable: An observable corresponds to a feature of a system, which can be investi-
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gated in a more or less meaningful way. Global observables pertain to the system as a
whole, local observables pertain to subsystems. In the above mentioned example systems,
observables may correspond to esthetic investigations for systems of (schools of) art.
Measurement : Doing a measurement of an observable A means performing the investiga-
tion which belongs to the observable A and arriving at a result a, which can claim factual
validity. What factual validity means depends on the system: Validity of a measurement
result for a system of physics, internal conviction for self observation, consensus for groups
of human beings. The result of the measurement of A will in general depend on the state
z of the system before the measurement but will not be completely determined by it.
Moreover, to every observable A we associate its spectrum, a set SpecA, which is
just the set of all possible measurement results of A. Immediately after a measurement
of an observable A with result a in SpecA, the system will be in an eigenstate za of the
observable A with eigenvalue a. The eigenstate za is a state, for which an immediate
repetition of the measurement of the same observable A will again yield the same result
a with certainty, and after this repeated measurement the system will still be in the
same state za. This property, which is also crucial in quantum physics justifies the
terminology “eigenstate of an observable A” for za and “eigenvalue” for the result a.
We emphasize that this is an idealized description of a measurement process abstracting
from its detailed temporal structure.
Two observables A and B are called complementary, if the corresponding measurements
are not interchangeable. This means that the state of the system depends on the order
in which the measurement results, say a and b, were obtained. If the last measurement
was a measurement of A, the system will end up in an eigenstate za of A, and if the
last measurement was a measurement of B, an eigenstate zb will result eventually. For
complementary observables A and B there will be at least some eigenvalue, say a, of one
of the observables for which no common eigenstate zab of both observables exists. This
means that it is not generally possible to ascribe sharp values to the complementary
observables A and B, although both of them may be equally important for the description
of the system. This is the essence of quantum theoretical complementarity which is well
defined also for GQT.
Non complementary observables, for which the order of measurement does not matter,
are called compatible. After the measurement of compatible observables A and B with
results a and b, the system will be in the same common eigenstate zab of A and B
irrespective of the order in which the measurements were performed.
Entanglement can also be defined in the framework of Generalized Quantum Theory
[11, 12, 13, 14]. It may and will show up under the following conditions:
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1. Subsystems can be identified within the system such that local observables pertain-
ing to different subsystems are compatible.
2. There is a global observable of the total system, which is complementary to local
observables of the subsystems.
3. The system is in an entangled state for instance in an eigenstate of the above men-
tioned global observable and not an eigenstate of the local observables.
Given these conditions, the measured values of the local observables will be uncertain
because of the complementarity of the global and the local observables. However, so-
called entanglement correlations will be observed between the measured values of the
local observables pertaining to different subsystems. These correlations are non-local and
instantaneous.
Comparing Generalized with physical Quantum Theory the following vital differences are
worth noticing:
• In GQT there is no quantity like Planck’s constant controlling the degree of com-
plementarity of observables. Thus, contrary to physical Quantum Theory, where
quantum effects are essentially restricted to the microscopic regime, macroscopic
quantum-like effects in GQT are to be expected.
• At least in its minimal version described here, GQT contains no direct reference to
time or dynamics.
• In its minimal version, GQT does not ascribe quantified probabilities to the out-
comes of measurements of an observable A in a given state z. Indeed, to give just
one example, for esthetic observables quantified probabilities seem to be inappro-
priate from the outset. What rather remains are modal logical qualifications like
“impossible”, “possible” and “certain”. Related to the absence of quantified ob-
servables, the set of states in GQT is in general not modelled by a linear Hilbert
space. Moreover, no addition of observables (operationally difficult to access even
in quantum physics) is defined in GQT.
• Related to this, GQT in its minimal form provides no basis for the derivation of
inequalities of Bell’s type for measurement probabilities, which allow for the conclu-
sion that the indeterminacies of measurement values are of an intrinsic ontic nature
rather than an epistemic lack of knowledge. In many (but not all) applications of
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GQT indeterminacies may be epistemic and due to incomplete knowledge of the
full state or uncontrollable perturbations by outside influences or by the process of
measurement. Notice that complementarity in the sense of GQT may even occur in
coarse grained classical dynamical systems [15, 7].
For some applications (see, e.g., [16, 17, 18, 19], ) one may want to enrich the above
described minimal scheme of GQT by adding further structure, e.g., an underlying
Hilbert space structure for the states.
We should stress here that for very general systems like the above mentioned schools
of art, observables are not so directly given by the system and read off from it like
many mechanical observables. On the contrary, as already suggested by the name
of an “observable”, the identification of an observable may be a highly creative act
of the observer, which will be essentially determined by his horizon of questions and
expectations. This marks a decidedly epistemic trait of the notion of observables in
GQT even more so than in quantum physics. Moreover, the horizon of the observer
will change, not the least as a result of his previous observations adding to the open
and dynamical character of the set of observables. What has just been said about
observables also applies to partitioning a system into subsystems. In fact, partitioning is
achieved by means of partition observables whose different values differentiate between
the subsystems. In general, subsystems do not preexist in a na¨ıve way but are in a sense
created in the constitutive act of their identification.
Quantum-like phenomena like complementarity in the sense of GQT may be expected
whenever ”measurement” operations change system states and are not commutable.
Such situations should abound in cognitive science and in everyday life. They apply in
a paradigmatic way to the human mind as seen from a first person perspective, because
the state of mind will invariably be changed by the very act of its conscious realization.
Human communities provide another important field of possible applications of GQT.
Detailed empirical investigations of quantum features in psychological systems have been
performed for bistable perception [16, 17, 18], decision processes, semantic networks,
learning and order effects in questionnaires [19]. (See [20] for further information.)
From the general system theoretic point of view adopted in our account of GQT and
also from everyday experience, classical as opposed to quantum-like systems should be a
rather special and rare case. They correspond to systems without complementarities: All
measurement operations commute without limitation and reveal an underlying objective
reality essentially untouched by the measurements. This is a very strong assumption and
a quantal world view in the sense of GQT looks quite natural and suggested by ontological
parsimony. The natural and to some extent even a priori character of quantum structure
6
is clearly pointed out by M. Bitbol. (See [21] and references therein.) Asking for the rea-
sons why nevertheless a classical world view is widely favored seems to be a legitimate task.
3 Fundamentals of the Mode of Human Existence
Any reflection about the phenomenal character of the world requires a detailed analysis
of the mode of human existence as a conscious being. This has been a main subject of
philosophy since the second half of the 19th century in particular of its phenomenological
line. Of course, in this study we can in no way do justice to the vast body of work and
thought done along this line associated to prominent names like Franz Brentano, Edmund
Husserl, Martin Heidegger or Jean-Paul Sartre. For a deep and comprehensive account
see [22]. For our purposes, it must suffice to point out a few constitutive characteristic
basics of human existence emerging from its analysis:
a) The figure of oppositeness
Man always experiences his world as an observer, set apart from and to some extent
opposed to the object of his attention. Ernst Tugendhat [23, 24, 25] from the position
of analytic philosophy refers to this basic human existential as to the ”egocentricity” of
man as an ”I-sayer”. In quantum physics the separation between observer and observed
system is known as the Heisenberg cut, which is movable but not removable. In our
more general framework we shall talk about the epistemic cut : Every cognition of a
form accessible to us is the cognition of someone about something. The location of
the epistemic cut may change depending on whether attention is directed to an object
outside or introspectively inside to the own state of mind, but the epistemic cut never
disappears altogether.
b) Temporality
Man’s mode of existence is inescapably time-bounded. The world appears to us not
in the form of a simultaneous panoramic picture but rather in the form of a movie: A
narrow window of a ”now” is shifted over our reality giving a free direct view only over
an ever-changing small part of it. This internal mental time is called by Mc Taggart
[26] an A-Time, which is characterized by the existence of a privileged instance of a
”now” and by its directedness towards a future. In strong contrast to this, the outer
time of physics is what Mc Taggart calls a B-Time, a scale time without a privileged
”now” and not necessarily directed. For the physical origin of time directedness see
[27]. More about the difficult problem of the relationship between inner and outer
time in the framework of GQT may be found in [28] and [29]. On an increasingly
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fundamental level of physics, proceeding from Newtonian Mechanics to Special and
General Relativity Theory, physical B-Time shows a tendency to become more and
more similar to space and eventually to fade away as a fundamental notion if quantum
effects of space-time and very strong gravitational fields are considered. (See [28] and
references therein.) However, internal A-Time persists and leaves deep traces in thermo-
dynamics via the close relationship between the thermodynamic time arrow [27] and the
so-called psychological time arrow and, as we shall see in a moment also in Quantum
Theory. The two basic existentials to be mentioned next are closely related to temporality.
c) Facticity
We conceive ourselves as living in a world of facts. The feeling of certainty of a visual
perception and the immediate presence in introspection all carry an inexorable imprint
of facticity. The ”now” is located in the heart of both temporality and facticity. Facts
underly Boolean Logic.
d) Causality and freedom
Causality and freedom of action are both offshoots of the same common root of a de-
veloped temporality unfolded into past, presence and future. Rather than being in an
exclusively contradictory relationship they rely on each other, because freedom is only
possible if actions have foreseeable consequences and causality can only be seen if there
is freedom in the choice of causes and initial conditions.
e) Agentivity
In our existence we experience ourself as agents, who actively steer the focus of their
attention and their bodily motions. Planning, worrying and procuring are our future
directed activities and attitudes. In this context it is also worth remembering that
”factum” literally means ”made”.
f) Emotionality
This study is centered around the cognitional activity of man. Nevertheless, it should be
kept in mind that emotions color all our perceptions and cognitions. We are continuously
assessing and judging. Emotions guide our will and intentions, are constitutive for our
personality and lie at the basis of our creativity.
We already saw that (Generalized) Quantum Theory, more so than classical theory,
takes into account the phenomenal character of our world. So, we should ask ourselves,
whether the basic categorical existentials enumerated above are reflected in the structure
of GQT. This, indeed, turns out to be true to a large extent:
a) The structures of oppositeness and epistemic cut are deeply rooted in the distinction
between system and observer as well as in the central role attributed to measurement.
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Observables neither exclusively pertain to the observer nor to the observed system but
could be said to be located astride of the epistemic cut.
b) Temporality leaves a subtle trace in the vital importance of the (temporal) order of
measurements. If observables A and B can be composed, their composition AB means
Aafter B. In addition, the facticity of measurement results, mentioned under point c),
enters via the ”now” of human A-Time.
c) Facticity is strongly present in the factual validity of measurement results. In a quan-
tum picture of the world, a quantum state before measurement describes a world of
potentialities or, more precisely, of timelessly extended simultaneity rather than factual
localization in a ”now”. From this point of view, every completed measurement corre-
sponds to an inroad of a classical world into a quantum world.
d) and e) become apparent in GQT in the planning and execution of experiments, and
in the choice of observables to be measured. They may also be formalized in dynamical
equations of motion.
f) Beyond its general great importance, emotionality does not play any special role in
GQT, which is essentially a theory of cognition. Moreover, and for good reasons, science
strives for emotional neutrality. However, systems of GQT may possess emotional ob-
servables concerning e.g. mood, contention, pleasantness, esthetic or moral value. Such
variables pertain to the cognitive, assessing component of emotions, which after all is
almost never missing.
The above-mentioned categorical existentials are to some extent suggestive of a classi-
cal world view. Evolutionary epistemology [30, 31] asserts that our cognitional system,
which is based on these existentials adaptively arose by Darwinian evolution: mutation
and selection. Comparison with other forms of life and with older pre-lingual stages of
man shows beyond any doubt that an evolution indeed occurred. It is also clear that our
cognitional system should not jeopardize our chances of survival. On the other hand, one
should not overlook some problematic features of evolutionary epistemology, at least in
its most popular interpretation:
• The environment, to which adaptation of the cognitional system has to proceed is
normally conceived as being of classical type, often even identified with a classical
physical system. Quantum notions are usually not assumed to be relevant. This
classical environment is normally considered to be rigid and not subject to evolu-
tion, at least as long as cultural evolution does not become topical. Evolution time
is identified with a directed physical time of B-type in the sense of Mc Taggart [26].
In addition, evolutionary epistemology often relies on a strong classical background
materialism and reductionism. This implies the danger of a gross underestimation
of the phenomenal character of our world. The world view of classical physics arises
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from a particular modelization of the world. As already mentioned in the Introduc-
tion, this is not completely illegitimate as a tentative ontological scenario. However,
in a na¨ıve realistic world view this model has become completely transparent and a
certain degree of opaqueness seems to be desirable.
• Even if we take the correctness of the central hypotheses of evolutionary episte-
mology for granted, the survival success of the evolved cognitive system in no way
guarantees the ontological validity of the emerging culture dependent world view, let
alone of reductive classical materialism. On the contrary, there are many examples,
in particular in cultural history demonstrating that the evolutionally more viable
view is not necessary the more correct one.
4 Excursus: Language
Language is an inseparable part of our human psychic endowment. So, we should not be
surprised to find the basic existentials of the previous section in human language. We
shall demonstrate this for 1) Facticity, 2) Temporality and 3) Agentivity:
1) Facticity
Facticity is reflected in what is called the propositional character of language [23, 24, 25]:
A normal uttering in human language is either a clause of statement or question. The
former directly claims facticity, and the latter asks about facticity. The only exceptions
are exclamations and imperative sentences. Both are archaic and syntactically isolated.
Imperatives are typically the most simple forms of the verb.
2) Temporality
Temporality is met in human languages in various forms
• It is manifest in the threefold temporal sequentiality of language in sounds, words
and sentences.
• Reference to time is expressed in the verb in many ways. Tenses express temporal
location with respect to the speaker (ex: ”He wrote”) and sometimes also with
respect to the reported action (ex: ”He had written”). Modes of action are related to
the lexical meaning of a verb and describe the temporal form of the action (durative,
ingressive, iterative, punctual,...) and aspects, which are of key importance e.g. in
Slavic languages, are forms of the verb allowing to express whether the speaker
wants to report on the action as ongoing or as a completed entity [32]. (English ex:
”He was writing a letter” vs ”He wrote a letter”)
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3) Agentivity
The default attitude whether a speaker understands himself primarily as (a) an acting or
as (b) an experiencing being differs between various languages. It has several linguistic
reflexes which show a tendency to be correlated:
• Most European languages favor attitude (a). For these languages the main dis-
tinction is between tenses, which is morphologically most clearly expressed is the
distinction between past and non-past (present/future), because it coincides with
the distinction between ”non influenciable” and ”influenciable”. For attitude (b) the
main distinction tends to be between future and non future (presence/past), which
corresponds to the distinction between invisible and visible. Eskimo languages are
an example for this state of affairs [33].
• European peoples normally conceive the future as approaching us from the front and
receding to the past which lies behind us. This is in line with an active attitude (a),
which considers the future as something to be faced and influenced. The converse
view, in accordance with attitude (b), for which the invisible future approaches from
the back side and turns into the visible presence and past in front of us has been
observed in Babylonian [34] and Aymara [35]. For instance, in Babylonian future
literally means ”lying in the back” and past ”lying in front”. Aymara speakers point
backwards when referring to the future.
• The difference between the active attitude (a) and the receptive attitude (b) may
also be mirrored in a preference for a accusativic and ergativic [36, 33] sentence
structure. Let us briefly explain this: Intransitive verbs (ex: ”to sit”) have only
one participant, the subject (S) (ex: ”Peter (S) is sitting”). The subject normally
stands in the most simple unmarked case, the nominative. Transitive verbs (ex:
”to hit”) have (at least) two participants, the actor (A) and the experiencer (E)
(ex: ”Peter (A) hits the ball (E)”). Almost all European languages except Basque
employ an accusativic sentence structure for transitive verbs: The actor (A) of a
transitive verb stands in the nominative case just like the subject (S) of the intransi-
tive verb, whereas the experiencer (E) stands in a different case, the accusative. (In
English, where nominative and accusative are morphologically differentiated only
for pronouns, both (S) and (A) stand before the verb and (E) behind the verb.)
This parallel treatment of (S) and (A) signals an active attitude placing the actor
in a privileged primary position.
Basque and many languages outside Europe (Caucasian languages, Eskimo lan-
guages, Maya languages, Australian aboriginal languages, Chukotian languages,...)
choose a different sentence construction for transitive verbs: The syntactic position
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of (E) runs in parallel with (S), whereas (A) stands in a different case called erga-
tive. Here, the pivotal position is occupied by the receptive experiencer (E). The
ergativic sentence construction is somewhat similar to the passive construction in
European languages (ex: ”The ball (E) is hit by Peter (A)”). However, the European
passive only arises by an additional transformation of an active sentence and the
accusative construction is the default. In ergative languages the ergative structure is
the default. (Indeed, many ergative languages have an ”antipassive” transformation
yielding an analogue of the normal sentence construction of accusative languages.)
Let us finally mention that many languages (e.g. Georgian and Sumerian) have
what is called an split ergative structure: Depending on the tense of the transitive
verb an accusative or ergative construction is applied. Not surprisingly, the ergative
sentence structure is favored in the past tense, because an action in the past cannot
be really performed but only reported or imagined.
5 Why Classical?
We have argued that in many respects a quantum-like world view seems to be more nat-
ural and ontologically parsimonious. Moreover, our introspective world as well as much
of our outside world, at least on closer inspection, makes a quantum-like impression. In
what follows, we shall give (A) categorial, (B) physical and (C) pragmatic reasons for
our strong inclination to conceive ourselves as living in a classical world. None of them
is completely cogent. After all, by a special intellectual effort, man has proved to be
capable to device a quantum-like world view and even to get acquainted to it to some
extent. But taking all these reasons together, our predilection for a classical world view
becomes almost irresistible, at least for everyday life.
A) We already mentioned that the basic categorical existentials of section 3 rather suggest
a classical world view. This in particular applies to the existencial of facticity. Our world,
as we experience it, is inescapably fact like, which is also reflected in the propositional
character of our language. From our very nature we have a deeply rooted tendency to
be na¨ıve realists unhesitatingly taking the representations on our internal screen as the
real world. Metzinger [4] asserts that transparent models are evolutionally favored. In
fact, in view of an approaching predator it would be a waste of time and energy for life
saving reaction to realize the representational character of its appearance on our inner
stage. On a higher level, we are naturally inclined to ontologize what on closer scrutiny
could only be granted a phenomenal status. This predilection for ontological scenarios is
an inseparable part of our mental endowment and of our culture. We already pointed out
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that an ontophobic ascetism may be barren. Ontologization is invaluable for understand-
ing and orientation in our world, as long as some degree of fluidity is preserved, which
sometimes allows us to look behind the screen and to correct inappropriate one-sidedness,
petrifaction and sclerotization. In particular, this kind of fluidity allows for the setup of
both quantum theoretically and classically inspired world scenarios.
B) The macroscopic validity of Classical Mechanics is often invoked as the reason for
the classical appearance of the world. In the macroscopic regime, to which Classical me-
chanics applies, quantum uncertainties are normally invisible because of the smallness of
Planck’s constant h¯. Moreover, by the quantum Zeno effect [37], repeated measuring and
monitoring of the system will prevent an uncontrolled growth of uncertainties. From a
fundamental point of view, the macroscopic classical limit of Quantum Theory and the
measurement process as an interaction with a macroscopic measurement device are not
completely understood in quantum physical terms, at least not for individual systems,
rather than ensembles. Decoherence theory [38] goes an important step in this direction.
It explains how normal unitary time evolution of pure states of macroscopic systems cou-
pled to an environment leads to states which, by local measurements on the system, are
indistinguishable from mixed states. The decoherence time needed to reach such states
quickly decreases with the sizes of the system and the environment and is typically very
small. What is not described by decoherence theory is the collapse of the wave function,
the transition from potentiality to measured facticity, which does not correspond to a
unitary evolution in time. Indeed, for individual physical systems instead of ensembles
there is so far no description of the collapse in terms of normal unmodified Quantum
Theory. This may be interpreted as a hint that measurement is not exclusively to be un-
derstood as a physical process but as an act of cognition, which is, of course, accompanied
by a physical process on a physical substrate but not to be identified with this physical
process. In fact, no clear physical criterium seems to be in sight qualifying a physical
process as a measurement process or as an act of cognition. This remark about a possible
non physical but cognitive nature of the measurement process applies to GQT even more
than to quantum physics. A physical analysis of a measurement process is important even
if it does not capture all its cognitional aspects. The situation presents itself as follows:
The requirement of the possibility of cognition is of course logically prior to any kind of
physics and physical measurement. The result of an investigation of the physical process
accompanying an act of cognition and measurement must be consistent with this possi-
bility. The Quantum Theory of the measurement process meets this requirement very
well. The measurement process is described by a quantum theoretical system containing
the measured system S, the measuring device M and possibly some environment E. An
entangled state evolves by unitary time evolution, which, by reduction to the measuring
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device M yields a mixed state ofM reproducing exactly the probabilities of measurement
results for S predicted by Quantum Theory for a state ρ of S before measurement. The
same probabilities are also obtained by applying the measurement of S in the state ρ′ of S
arising by decoherence theory after reducing an evolved entangled state ρ′′ of S+M(+E)
to S.
Given the macroscopic validity of Classical mechanics, we should not forget that Classical
Mechanics only describes a narrow and highly idealized sector of the world in which we
find ourselves living. As already mentioned, other important parts of it, including our in-
ner and social world, are rather quantum-like constituted in the sense of GQT. So, the hint
to Classical Mechanics does not really answer our original question but rather rephrases
it in the form: Why do we attribute so much importance to Classical Mechanics in the
formation of our world model? A categorial reason for this inclination has already been
given under (A). There are other logically not completely unrelated reasons for favoring
a classical world view:
C1) Man in his temporal mode of existence has good reasons to keep to the more stable
and reliable features of his physical and social environment. In the material world, a bow
spanned and pointed the same way must produce the same shot and a leap done with
the same force must carry over the same distance. The necessary stability of a human
society is based on a common stock of accepted facts and values and a collection of com-
patible observables and of histories whose consistency [39] is generally acknowledged. A
cultural habitat of (floating) islands of stability is woven as a result of continuous col-
lective work. (This comparison comes from a visit of the Uru-Chipaya tribe, who really
lives on floating islands on lake Titicaca built from reed and continuously enlarged and
repaired also by incorporation of waste.) The subtle and impressive building of classical
natural science is a monumental example of probably the largest consistent structure of
our time. Historiography and belief systems build other islands. Hans Primas [40] talks
about partially Boolean Systems. Our cultural activity tries to extend them as much as
possible. Consistency between different islands and sometimes even inside the islands
cannot always be achieved, if complementarity is really a general constitutive feature of
the world. For the sake of cohesion of society it is natural not to stress but rather to
suppress such inconsistencies and anomalies. All this leads to the stabilization of a world
view of predominantly classical type.
C2) All kind of information is factual, even information about Quantum Theory. In our
life we are swamped with (hard) facts, which peremptorily call for attention, respect and
action. The inevitability of death is a particularly grim example of impending factuality.
The possibility to store and accumulate facts as documents further adds to their over-
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whelming dominance.
C3) In a world of surprises and unpredictability man tends to explain uncertainties by
lack of knowledge or understanding. This suggests a classical background model of the
world, which is difficult empirically to tell apart from a quantum-like model. The key
paradigm of unpredictability is the autonomous behavior of personal beings. Quite nat-
urally in earlier stages of mankind animistic world models prevailed and soothing and
reconciliating strategies were largely employed to influence potentially dangerous or help-
ful personal instances. Even for the rather quantum-like internal world intuitions and
dreams were widely interpreted as messages from outside intelligences. The development
proceeded in the direction of successively substituting personal agents by ”natural” ones,
which promised a higher degree of control and understanding. A culmination of this de-
velopment is marked by the success of deterministic Classical Mechanics together with
a program of replacing all spiritual aspects of the world by physical reductionism. In
addition, classical logic seemed to imply a classical world view. (In fact, also Quantum
Theory can be formulated with classical logic.)
Finally, we should mention that also in GQT a quantum Zeno effect [37, 16, 17, 18]
strengthens the facticity of measurement results, which can be stabilized and held fixed
by continuous observation and sufficiently frequent repetition of a measurement.
6 Concluding Remarks
Although many factors, including our categorical framework, urge us to adopt a classical
world view, this tendency is not an inescapable fate. Man at least has the capability
to reflect on his categorial endowment, to question it and to try a glimpse behind this
curtain.
We already mentioned several times that large parts of our world are organized in a
quantum-like way, even if a classical background model prevents us from acknowledging
this explicitly and suggests alternative terminologies and explanations. The human mind
and its products, the internal and social world of human beings are quantum reservations.
The simultaneous presence of alternatives in a quantum state has an enormous creative
potential, which may very well be active in such highly creative processes like formation
of concepts, identification of systems, detection of observables and also in social empathy
and cultural activities like poesy and fine arts. The notion of implicate order developed
by D. Bohm and B. Hiley [41, 5] is closely related to this creative potential. It would
be surprising if evolution had not made use of it, and the work on the development of a
quantum computer is an endeavor to exploit it even technically.
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Moreover, the Quantum Theory of measurement teaches us that measurement/cognition
are realized by means of quantum entanglement correlations.
There is another reason that the limitations imposed on us by the framework of our cate-
gorical existentials are not unsurmountable: Mankind is continuously striving to transcend
its own categorical framework. In fact, the very term of ”existence” literally means ”step-
ping out”. This tendency is already prepared in the phylogeny of man and repeated in its
ontogeny. The temporality of simple animals strictly confines them to a narrow ”now”.
The unfolding of temporalty into present, past and future is an act of emancipation. The
possibility to re-present other instances of time enormously widens the temporal screen.
Planning, worrying and freedom of action now become possible.
Language enables symbolic representations and an emancipation from blunt facts in a
mode of contrafactuality, in which the space of possibilities can be freely explored. Under
this perspective, the emergence of Quantum Theory may be interpreted as a late highlight
in this emancipatory process.
Man also rebels against the limitation imposed by oppositeness and the epistemic cut
trying to see himself integrated and secured in an all-comprising world. Seeking mystic
unity [23, 24, 25] or strict mechanistic reductionism can be seen to stand for two opposite
extremal attempts to overcome the structure of an individuum confronted to its world.
Both of them tend to neglect the phenomenal character of the world, which is taken into
account in a balanced and subtle way by Quantum Theory.
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